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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-1707 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOSE PABLO PEREZ-ARIAS, 
        Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-00756-004 
 (Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 May 26, 2011 
 
 Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  June 17, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jose Pablo Perez-Arias pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to conduct 
financial transactions involving proceeds of specified unlawful activity and one count of 
intentional distribution of more than five kilograms of cocaine, knowing the cocaine 
would be unlawfully imported into the United States. He was sentenced to eighty-seven 
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months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, Perez-Arias 
contends he was entitled to a downward departure based on minor role. He also contends 
his sentence was unreasonable because it failed to reflect the greater culpability of a co-
defendant. We will affirm. 
I. 
 In February 2006, Perez-Arias began negotiating with an individual to obtain 
assistance laundering proceeds Perez-Arias held in the United States from illegal 
narcotics trafficking. Unbeknownst to Perez-Arias, that individual was a confidential FBI 
informant. On April 4, 2006, Perez-Arias arranged for a co-conspirator to deliver 
approximately $248,526 to the informant’s associate in Puerto Rico. This money was 
then transferred via wire to Perez-Arias’s co-conspirators in Colombia, Miguel 
Hernandez Amezquita-Machado and John Wilson Vasquez-Martinez. Perez-Arias 
received a portion of the money. 
 Perez-Arias subsequently negotiated with the informant to sell multiple kilograms 
of cocaine. On August 22, 2006, Perez-Arias exchanged approximately six kilograms of 
cocaine with the informant for $13,200 in a hotel in Bogota, Colombia. Perez-Arias knew 
the cocaine would be unlawfully imported into the United States and shipped to Newark, 
New Jersey.  
 On September 17, 2007, a grand jury indicted Perez-Arias, Amezquita-Machado, 
Vasquez-Martinez, and two co-defendants on eleven counts of various drug-related and 
money laundering offenses. Perez-Arias was charged with one count of money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) and (h) for conspiring to conduct 
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financial transactions involving proceeds of specified unlawful activity, knowing the 
transactions were designed to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, and control 
of the proceeds and to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under federal law. He 
was also charged with one count of intentional distribution of more than five kilograms of 
cocaine, knowing the cocaine would be unlawfully imported into the United States, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 959 and 960(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On December 5, 2007, 
Colombian authorities arrested Perez-Arias, and he was later extradited to the United 
States. On October 7, 2009, he pleaded guilty. 
 In a Presentence Report (PSR), the United States Probation Office recommended a 
base offense level of eight for the money laundering count under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 and a 
twelve-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) because Perez-Arias laundered 
more than $200,000 but less than $400,000. The PSR recommended a further six-level 
increase under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1) because he knew or believed the funds were the 
proceeds of an offense involving the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a 
controlled substance. The PSR recommended a final two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(2)(B) because Perez-Arias was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The PSR 
recommended a total offense level of twenty-eight for the money laundering count. 
 The PSR recommended a base offense level of thirty-two for the distribution count 
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) because Perez-Arias delivered more than five and less than 
fifteen kilograms of cocaine. It recommended a two-level reduction under the “safety 
valve” of U.S.S.G. §§ 5C1.2 and 2D1.1(b)(11) because Perez-Arias had no criminal 
history points, did not threaten or use violence, did not cause injury in committing the 
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offense, did not lead others in the offense or engage in a continuing criminal enterprise, 
and truthfully provided all information he possessed concerning the offenses. The PSR 
recommended a total offense level of thirty for the distribution count. 
 The PSR recommended a combined offense level of thirty-two for Perez-Arias 
under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, adding one level for each count to the higher offense level. It 
recommended a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for accepting 
responsibility. The PSR concluded no mitigating role adjustment was warranted under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 because Perez-Arias “had other individuals acting on his behalf.” PSR 
34. Overall, the PSR recommended a total offense level of twenty-nine which, combined 
with Perez-Arias’s lack of criminal history and safety valve reduction, resulted in an 
advisory sentencing guideline range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. The District 
Court, after hearing argument, determined a mitigating role adjustment was unwarranted 
and sentenced Perez-Arias to eighty-seven months’ imprisonment followed by five years’ 
supervised release. Perez-Arias timely appealed.
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II. 
 On appeal, Perez-Arias contends the court erred in denying his request for a 
downward departure based on minor role.
2
  Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guildelines 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
2
 We “must sustain a district court’s factual findings as to a § 3B1.2 . . . minor role 
adjustment unless those findings are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 
318, 351 (3d Cir. 2002). Because the District Court’s determination is “heavily dependent 
upon the facts of a particular case,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C), “district courts are 
allowed broad discretion in applying this section.” United States. v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 
F.3d 236, 238 (3d Cir. 1998). We will reverse only if we are “left with the definite and 
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provides for a two-level decrease if the defendant was a “minor participant” in an 
offense:  
A defendant’s eligibility for minor participant status turn[s] on whether the 
defendant’s involvement, knowledge, and culpability were materially less 
than those of other participants. This determination depends upon the 
following: (1) the defendant’s awareness of the nature and scope of the 
criminal enterprise; (2) the nature of the defendant’s relationship to the 
other participants; and (3) the importance of the defendant’s actions to the 
success of the venture. 
 
United States v. Brown 250 F.3d 811, 819 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 Perez-Arias intentionally laundered significant proceeds from illegal drug 
trafficking. He orchestrated a sophisticated, international transaction designed to conceal 
illicit activity from U.S. law enforcement. He also sold cocaine he knew would be 
illegally imported into the United States for a substantial sum of money. Based on these 
facts, the court did not clearly err in concluding Perez-Arias did not deserve a decrease in 
offense level based on minor role. 
III. 
 Perez-Arias also contends the District Court imposed an unreasonable sentence 
that failed to reflect the greater culpability of co-defendant Amezquita-Machado.
3
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firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 
556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3
 We “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-
of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The touchstone of 
reasonableness is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 
(internal quotations marks omitted). We are deferential to the District Court’s application 
of these factors, and “will affirm . . . unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
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U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) requires sentencing courts to consider “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct.” Amezquita-Machado received a sentence of ninety 
months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of laundering approximately 
$377,004 and one count of distributing approximately six kilograms of cocaine.
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Amezquita-Machado’s PSR recommended the same total offense level and advisory 
sentencing guideline range as was recommended for Perez-Arias.  
 Congress enacted § 3553(a)(6) “to promote national uniformity in sentencing 
rather than uniformity among co-defendants in the same case. . . . Therefore, a defendant 
cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to seek a reduced sentence designed to lessen disparity 
between co-defendants’ sentences.” United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 
2006). Furthermore, Perez-Arias’s and Amezquita-Machado’s sentences differ by three 
months, reflecting the $128,478 disparity in money laundered. While the District Court 
did not explicitly justify the sentencing disparity on these grounds, the court need not 
“discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear 
the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 
324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 
U.S. 85 (2007). The District Court properly applied the required § 3553(a) factors, 
concluding Perez-Arias should be sentenced at the lowest end of the guideline range. It 
                                                                                                                                                             
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the District Court 
provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
4
 On motion of the government, the court dismissed four other counts of money 
laundering against Amezquita-Machado. 
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did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Perez-Arias to eighty-seven months’ 
imprisonment. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
